LEACH vs. MARSH.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine-06unty of York.
NATHANIEL LEACH, ADM'R, IN ERROR, V&-.MARY MARSH.
A judgment recovered on default, against a person admitted to have been non
compos menti at the time of the proceedings in the case, will be reversed on a
writ of error brought by his administrator after his decease.
Actions brought against persons non compo for necessaries, it seems, constitute an
exception; but, in such case, the defendant in error should plead the fact in bar
of the suit.
The case of a judgment on default, against, a person admitted to have been non compos, is to be distinguished from such cases as Ring vs. Robinson, 33 Maine 114,
where the fact of unsoundness of mind was not admitted, and the defendant
appeared by attorney, and judgment was rendered upon' a trial and verdict.
It would be manifestly unjust to render judgment against a party or his estate,
when he had no capacity to take care of his own affairs or to employ another
to do it.

Writ of error. On report by APPLETON, J.
Mary Marsh brought an action against Asa Leach, December 6,
1854; the writ was returned as served by leaving a summons "1at
the last and usual place of abode" of the defendant, and real estate
attached; and, at January term, 1855, the defendant not appearing,
a default was entered, and judgment was given for the-plaintiff for
$344.26, and costs of suit. Execution was issued, and extended
by levy on the real estate of Leach.
Asa Leach having deceased, the plaintiff in error, appointed
administrator on the estate of the deceased, sued Out this writ of
error against the said Mary Marsh, September 14, 1857, praying
that the former judgment in her favor may be reversed, and
assigning the following errors:1, 2 and 3. Want of notice and insufficient service on the deceased. 4. "The said Asa Leach, at the time that the officer's
return of service of said writ upon said Asa Leach purports to
have been made, and for a long time before that date, and from
that time until his decease, after the rendition of said judgment,
was non compos mentis, and incapable of taking care of himself and
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of managing his business affairs." 5. "No guardian ad litem was
appointed, by the Court for said Asa Leach, he being at that time
non compos mentis, and having no guardian." 6. The judgment
was obtained by collusion and fraud. 7. Asa Leach did not at the
time owe Mary Marsh anything. 8. By the rendition of said
judgment, great injustice was done, &c.
The defendant, in her answer, traversed the first, second, third,
and sixth assignments of error, but pleaded to the fourth, fifth,
seventh, and eighth specifications, that there was "no error, either
in the record and proceedings aforesaid, or in giving the judgment
aforesaid," &c.
It was admitted that Asa Leach was non compos mentis, as
alleged in the writ of error, and that the plaintiff was duly appointed
administrator of said Asa Leach, May 5, 1856.
The depositions of Ezra Fairfield and John B. Fairfield, introduced by the plaintiff, tended to prove that the deceased was non
compos mentis from about 1851 to his death.
It was agreed that the full Court should render such judgment
as the law and facts authorize.
.E. E. Bourne, Jr., for the plaintiff, argued elaborately the several
points presented by the assignment of errors; but the case was
decided mainly with reference to the fourth specification.
The question whether a judgment rendered against a peison
insane or non .compos mentis at the time of the service of the writ
upon him is erroneous has never been raised in this State; but many
analogous cases are found in the Reports.
In Mansfield vs. Mansfield, 13 Mass. 412, which was a libel for
divorce, the respondent was defaulted; but, on suggestion to the
Court that he had become insane, the default was taken off, and
further proceedings stayed until a guardian was appointed.
A judgment recovered against, a person out of the State, without
actual notice, will be reversed on error. Blanchard vs. Wildes, 1
Mass. 841; Smith vs. Rice, 11 Mass. 307; Tatcher vs. Miller,
11 Mass. 418 ; Same vs. Same, 13 Mass. 270 ; Vilton Manuf. c.
vs. Woodman, 32 Maine 185; Galusha vs. 6obleigh, 13 N. H. 79.
A party having a right to appeal, but, without negligence on his
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part, unable to avail himself of his right, is entitled to a writ of
error. 31Monk vs. Guild, 3 Met. 373; Skepwith vs. Hill, 2 Mass.
35; Keen vs. Turner, 13 Mass. 265; Gay vs. Richardson, 18
Pick. 418.
Other grounds of reversal of judgment on account of incapacity
to defend, are the death of one of the parties after suit commenced,
the infancy of a party having no guardian, or coverture of a party
without the joinder of the husband. 2 Tidd's Practice 1033; 3
Black. Com. 406, note 4; Smith vs. Rhodes, 29 Maine 360.
These authorities are based on the ground'that the defendant has
been barred of the opportunity to make a defence, either from want
of notice or incapacity to defend. Do not the same reasons apply
with equal force to the case of a person non compos mentis ? Mitchell vs. Kingman, 5 Pick. 434.
The Court in this State, although the question has not been
distinctly decided, has repeatedly intimated that error is the proper
remedy in the case of a judgment recovered against a person so
Smith vs. Rhodes, before cited; McArthur vs.
incapacitated.
&arret, 43 Maine 435.
In the case of King vs. Robinson, 33 Maine 114, relied upon
by the defendant in error, although King was non compos, and no
guardian was or had been appointed for him, yet he appeared by
attorney, a hearing was had, and a verdict was rendered against
him. The Court decided that, as he was represented in Court by
his attorney, the judgment ought not to be reversed. King had
counsel, and his counsel did not request the appointment of a
guardian. The Court, therefore, decided against him. The decision is not a precedent for a case so unlike as the case at bar.
It is true there are incidental remarks, in the opinion delivered
by C. J. SHEPLEY, which were not called for by the case, nor
sustained by the authorities cited, some of which, however, are
English cases decided on extremely arbitrary and anti-republican
principles, and others are New York cases based on the old English
authorities.
In a case of this kind, a writ of error is the most efficient and
direct, as well as the least expensive process to obtain justice.

LEACH vs. MARSH-

Arnold vs. Tourtellot, 13 Pick. 172; .Hartvs. .fuckiizs, 5 Mass.
260 ; Blanchard vs. Wilde, 1 Mass. 841 ; Wilton. J.anufacturing
Co. vs. Butter, 84 Maine 431.
Goodwin and .ales, for the defendant in error, after arguing the
1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 8th specifications of error, contended,
with regard to the 4th and 5th, that the -mere fact that a party
defendant was non compos menti is no error. It has never been
decided that proceedings may not be instituted, and prosecuted to
final judgment, against a person who has become non compos.
King vs. Robinson, 83 Maine 114.
The 5th specification is void for uncertainty. Even brief statements must contain specifications stated with certainty and precision
to a common intent. Washburne vs. Mosely, 2 Maine 160; Nelson vs. Swan, 13 Johns. 483; 1 Chitty's Pleadings 398; .Eustisvs.
Kidder, 26 Maine 97.
The counsel for the plaintiff allege a distinction between this
case and that of King vs. Robinson, on the ground that in that case
there was an appearance by attorney, and a trial, whereas here
there was a default. Yet he has not assigned that fact for error.
The defendant was duly notified of the pendency of the suit, and
failed to appear. The Court entered a default, pursuant to thp
statute, c. 82, § 2.
If by such default injustice was done to the defendant, he can
on petition have a review; but there can be no error in following
the provisions of the statute.
The mere fact that a defendan.t is non compos mentis, at the
service of the process or when judgment is rendered, is no defence;
for, at law and in equity, a contract or liability assumed by him
while of sound mind may be enforced against him when he is ot
unsound mind. King vs. Robinson, before cited; JHix vs. Whitmore, 4 Met. 545; White vs. Palmer,4 Mass. 147; Hathaway vs.
Clark, 5 Pick. 490.
The opinion of the Court was drawn up by
GOODENOW, J.-This is a writ of error, dated September 14,
1857, to reverse a judgment rendered by this Court on the 25th
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day of January, 1855, on default, against the plaintiff's intestate.
The officer returned an attachment of real estate, and that he
made service on the defendant "by leaving a summons at his last
and usual place of abode," &c.
The fourth error assigned is, that-" The said Asa Leach, at the
time that the officer's return of service of said writ upon said Asa
Leach purports to have been made, and for a long time before that
date, and from that time until his decease after the rendition of
said judgment, was non compos mentis, and incapable of taking
care of himself, and of managing his business affairs." To this
assignment of error, the defendant pleads "in nullo est erratum,"
which plea is a confession of all errors in facts which are well
assigned. The depositions in the case prove the fact, and it is
expressly admitted, that the plaintiff's intestate.at the times when,
&c., was non compos mentis, as alleged in the writ. Is this such an
error as requires us to reverse the judgment? It is a fundamental
principle, in all good governments, that no man shall be condemned,
civilly or criminally, without first having had an opportunity to be
heard in his defence. Saint Paul was exceedingly happy to have
an opportunity to answer for himself, touching the things whereof
he was accused by the Jews, and it would have been a great loss
to the world if he had been deprived of it.
This is an error not appearing on the face of the record. It is
an error of fact, if error it is.
"But a reversal may take place for errors of fact, as when the
defendant was a maniac, or non compos mentis, being legally
incapable of making a defence, or when he was absent from the
State, and had no actual notice of the suit, and was defaulted and
judgment rendered at the first term, without a continuance as the
statute requires." Smith vs. Rhodes, 29 Maine 861, and cases
there cited.
In Mitchell et al. vs. Eiingman, 5 Pick. 431, it was held that a
person may plead that he was non compos mentis, or show it in
evidence under the general issue, in avoidance of his contract. In
Seaver vs. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304, the doctrine of the above case
has been again declared to be sound, and the established law of
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Massachusetts, notwithstanding some recent decisions in England,
which seem to hold a different doctrine. In Grant vs. Thompson,
4 Conn. 204, the defence of insanity was admitted to an action on
a promissory note.
In Seaver vs. Phel,8, WILDE, J., says,-It is sometimes difficult
to determine what constitutes insanity, and to distinguish between
that and great weakness of understanding. "The boundary between
them may be very narrow, and, in fact, often is, although the legal
consequences and provisions attached to the one and the other
respectively are widely different. In the present case, however,
this point is settled by the verdict, and no question is made respecting
it." The same point is settled in the case at bar. The fairness
of the defendant's conduct, if fair it was, cannot supply the want
of capacity in the plaintiffs intestate.
While the courts have power to protect the property of a defendant who is temporarily absent from the State, against a suit of which
he has not had notice, if they have no power to protect the property of an insane man against a suit when there has been no
hearing, and no opportunity for a hearing, and no notice t9 a
responsible party of the existence of the suit, it is to be regretted,
to be lamented. It is said this specification is insufficient, that the
original defendant was "non compos mentis" at the time when, &c.
When the insanity is once established, or admitted to have existed,
the fact carries all the other necessary consequences along with it.
It follows that there has been no hearing; no legal party.
In King vs. Bobinson, 33 Maine 123, the late 0. J. SHEPLEY
says,-" The law does Vot appear to have imposed it as a duty to
be performed by the plaintiff to ascertain the mental capacity of the
defendant and to bring it before the Court for its consideration,
that such a guardian" (ad litem) "may be appointed." But with
all due respect, it seems to us that reason and justice and safety do
impose such a duty upon the plaintiff in a case like the present. In
1 Mass. 341, SEDGWICK, J.,. says,-" Although the Court cannot
know the fact," (of absence from the State,) "otherwise than by
suggestion entered on the record, yet, if the plaintiff will take
judgment, he does it at his peril. It was his duty to make the
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suggestion, and, in practice, it was always made, if mae at all,
under the former statute, by the plaintiff; for who else could make
it? Not the defendant surely; for he is supposed to be wholly
ignorant of the existence of the suit." Again, "the statute is
against the common law, (by which personal notice is always
necessary,) and, therefore, ought to be construed strictly. And it
is of very great importance that judgments rendered against persons, who have not, in fact, had notice, should not be binding,
unless the Court, from the positive provisions of the statute, are
bound to say they are." DANA, 0. J., says,-" But who is to
make the suggestion? The plaintiff, undoubtedly, and if he will
take a judgment, be does it at his peril." If a plaintiff will take
judgment against a man hopelessly insane, without a suggestion of
the insanity to the Court, or notice to guardian or next friend,
must he not do it at his peril?
Can he thus carve for himself, without regard to the rights of
others ?
In commenting upon the case of White vs. Palmer,4 Mass. 147,
Mr. Justice SHEPLEY says, "the error assigned was, that the
original defendant was non compos mentis, and that White and
Hall, long before the teste of the writ, had been legally appointed
guardians, and that they had no notice of the suit. The judgment
was reversed for that cause, but the case does not decide that the
judgment would not have been legal, if the non compos had not
been under guardianship." Upon this hypothesis, it would seem
that the judgment was reversed because there had not been due
courtesy exercised toward the guardians, not op account of a
wrong and injury done to the non compos, and to his estate.
In Seaver vs. Phelps, before cited, WILDE, J., says,-" The
general doctrine, that the contracts and other acts in pais, of idiots
and insane persons, are not binding in law or equity, is not denied.
Being bereft of reason and understanding, they are considered
incapable of consenting to a contract, or of doing any other valid
act."
Actions may have been maintained against persons non compos
for necessaries, as in Bagster et al. vs. The Earl of Portsmouth, 5
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Barn. & Cres. 172, and Thompson vs. Leach, 3 Wend. 310. But
this is an exception, and not the general rule. - "If, then, idiots
and insane persons are liable on their contracts for necessaries,
they are certainly entitled to as much protection as infants. It
matters not, however, how this may be, since the contract in question is not one for necessaries:" 11 Pick. 307. If the contract
in this case had been for necessaries, and that had been a legal
answer, the defendant in error should have pleaded the fact in bar
of the writ.
"The Court will generally allow the defendant in' error to come
in and plead that the said judgment is not erroneous, in any
matter of fact, in manner and form, &c., and tender an issue to
the country. With this plea, he may be required to file a specifidation, setting forth, in addition to a denial of the fact assigned for
error, any other matter of fact in avoidance, on which he relies,
tending to show that the judgment ought not to be reversed." 6
Met. 489.
It was held in Lamprey vs. Yudd, 9 Foster 303, that the fact
that a person against whom a suit was commenced was, at the time
of the service of the process upon him, a person of insane mind,
and that he so continued until the time of the rendition of judgment, even if he appeared in person, or by attorney, or not at all,
was good cause for reversing the judgment on error.
The case of King vs. .Robin8on seems to be relied upon by the
defendant in error as decisive of this case. In that case, there
was an appearance by attorney. In that case, it was not admitted,
as it is in this, that the plaintiff in error was, at the time when,
&c., actually non compos. While that question was suspended in
doubt in the mind of the Judge, it would be a question addressed
to his diicretion, whether a guardian ad litem should or should not
be appointed. But when it is once incontestably settled in the
affirmative, it would be manifestly against first principles, for the
Court to proceed to render judgment against a man or his estate,
when he had no capacity to take care of himself or to employ some
other person to do so.
In Rix v. Whittemore, 4 Met. 545, the error assigned was that,
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at the time of the service of the said original writ, and at the time
of the rendition of said judgment, the plaintiff in error was insane;
and an issue was made to the jury. There was no intimation from
the Court or counsel that the assignment was insufficient, if founded
in fact.
The verdict was for the plaintiff in error, and was set aside on
exceptions, on account of the supposed misdirection of the Judge
as to the burden of proof, or as to the presumption of the continuance of the insanity, when once proved to have existed.
It becomes unnecessary to discuss the questions arising out of
the other assignments of error; as we regard the fourth error
assigned sufficient in law, and proved and admitted in fact.
Judgment reversed.
APPLETON, CUTTING, and DAvis, Js., dissented.
TENNEY, C. J., RIcE, MAY, and KENT, Js., concurred in the

opinion.
Case came before all the Judges.
It seems well settled that contracts
by lunatics and persons of unsound
mind, as a general rule, are not binding. Lincoln vs. Buckmaster, 32 Vt.
R. 652, and numerous cases there cited.
But there are many exceptions to this
general rule.
1. Where merchants, apparently sane,
have purchased goods in the ordinary
course of their business, and having
disposed of them, in whole or in part,
so that the goods cannot be restored to
the seller, there is no question of the
general liability upon such contracts,
notwithstanding it should appear that
the purchaser was in fact insane at the
time of the purchase. Beals vs. Lee,
10 Barr 56; Molton vs. Camroux, 2
Exch. R. 502; S. C. 4 Id. 17. And the
same rule extends to all cases where
the seller has parted with his property
in good faith, and it is not in the power
of the lunatic to restore it. Even

courts of equity refuse to interpose to
set aside the contracts of lunatics, unless the parties can be restored to their
former condition, or the sane party has
taken some unconscionable advantage
in the bargain. Neil vs. MIorley, 9
Vesey 478. The parties are left to their
legal rights. Sageron vs. Leaky, 2 Atk.
R. 412. The same rule extends to
contracts made with infants. Farr vs.
Sumner, 12 Vt. R. 28; Taft vs. Pike,
14 Id. 405; Wead vs. Beebe, 21 Id. 495.
But the recovery in both cases should
be upon the guantum meruit, rather than
upon the contract.
2. Contracts for necessaries for the
lunatic or his family are binding to the
same extent, and much upon the samt
principles as similar contracts by infants. Thompson vs. Leach, 3 Mod. R.
310; Seaver vs. Phelps, 11 Pick. R.
304, 306. Some of the American cases
go the length of holding, that no re-
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cvery can be had against a lunatic,
upon a contract express or implied, unless for necessaries. Seaver vs. Phelps,
aupra; Fitzgerald vs. Reed, 9 Sm. &
Marshall; Pearl vs. McDowell, 3 3. ..
Marsh. 658; 2 Greenl. Ev. 369; Lincoln vs. Buckmaster, supra.
The rule in regard to instituting legal
proceedings against a lunatic is much
the same as that which obtains in the
case of infants; and there would seem
to be more reason for a strict enforcement of it in the former case than in
the latter, since infants, long before
they get out of their nonage, are entirely competent to select counsel, and
conduct the defence of a suit.
'This subject is very elaborately discussed by WooDnuRY, J., in Lang vs.

Whidden, 2 N. H. R. 435, where the
authorities, prior to that date (1822),
will be found very extensively quoted,
and the subject very learnedly discussed, and satisfactorily disposed of
by the court. It is here said the
guardian must be notified, in all cases,
or the judgment will be erroneous,

The same rule has been adopted in
many of the American States. Aldridge
vs. Montgomery, 9 Ind. R. 302; Snow
den vs. Danbury, 11 Penn. Sr. R. 522;
2 Barb. Ch. R. 387; Wright's Appeal, 8
Barr 57; 6 B. Mon. R. 239. But if one
who is a lunatic be arrested or imprisoned in a civil suit., he is not entitled to his release on that account. A
guardian ad Zitem may be appointed,
and the suit proceed. Bush vs. Pettibone, 4 Comst. R. 300; Aldrich vs. Williams, 12 Vt. R. 413.
There seems to be no good ground to
question the decision in the principal
case. The same rule has long been
established in regard to judgments
rendered against infants, without the
appointment of guardians ad litem. 2
Saund. R. 212, n. 4; Castlemain vs.
Moody, 4 B. & Ad. 90; see also Mason
vs. Dennison, 15 Wendell 64; Wead vs.
Marsh, 14 Vt. R. 77 ; CroQkett vs. Drew,
5 Gray 399.
I. F. R.

In the u~preme Court of the State of New York, Oct. 22, 1862.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE HANOVER BANK VS.
OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS

THE COMMISSIONERS

OF !THE CITY AND

COUNTY OF NEW

YORK.
[Before Ingraham, Barnard, and Clerke, Js.1]
1. By the second section of the Act of Congress, passed February 25, 1862, it is
provided that "All stocks, bonds, and other securities of the United States,
held by individuals, corporations, or associations within the United States, shall
be exempt from taxation by or under State authority." The effect of this see1 We owe this case to the courtesy of INGRAHAM, P. J., for which he will accept
our thank.-EDs.
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ti is to exempt from taxation, under the laws of this State, all stocks, bonds,
and other securities issued by the United States after the passage ot the ,ict.
1. This Court is bound by the decision of the Court of Appeals, in the. case of The
People cx rd. The Bank of the Conmmuonwealth, 23 N. Y. 192; (1 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 81), as to cases coming within its scope. By force of that decision,
securities of a like nature, issued before the passage of the not in question, and
owned by a resident of the State, are not exempt from taxation under State
laws, if no unfriendly discrimination to the United States, as borrowers, is
applied by the State law; and property in United States stock is subjected to
no greater burdens than property in general.
3. Congress has no power, by retrospective legislation, to withdraw from State
taxation stocks and other like securities, issued by the United States, already
subject to such taxation, and so far as the Act of February 25, 1862, exempts,
from State taxation, United States securities previously issued, it is extra constitutional and inoperative.

The relutors, the Hanover Bank, having a capital of $1,000,000,
were assessed at $908,119, the assessors having deducted from the
capital the value of the real estate, and stocks in other corporations. The bank objected to this assessment, upon the ground that
the bank owned stocks, bonds, and other securities of the United
States to the amount of $896,560, and claimed to be entitled to
have the amount reduced to $105,000. The Commissioners of
Taxes and Assessments refused such application, and the case was
brought to this Court on certiorari.
Charles Tracy, Esq., for relator.
H. f. Anderson and Greene C. Bronson, Esqs., for respondents.
By the Court.
INGRAHAM, P. J.-So far as the questions inv'lved in this case
were discussed and decided by the Court of Appeals, in the case of
The People ex rel. The Bank of the Commonwealth, 23 N. Y. Rep.
192, we do not feel at liberty to express any opinions at variance
therewith. That case must be understood as deciding that stock
1)f the United States held by a corporation or by individuals maybe taxed under the laws of this State, where such taxation is
general as applying to all personal property, and no unfriendly discrimination to the United States stock is applied by the State law,
or, in other words, that where the taxation was general on the
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personal property of an individual or corporation, property which
if nominally taxed as stock of the United States could not be
taxed,.may be included in the general aggregate of property liable
'to taxation, and the tax thus be imposed.
It is conceded that property exempt from taxation by law must
be deducted from the aggregate valuation of personal property thus
subject to assessment, and this principle was .afterwards settled by
the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in the -People ex
rNl. Hoyt vs. The Uommzssioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y. Rep. 224, in
which it was held that the personal property of an individual residing in this State, actually situated in another State or county,
is not to be included in the assessment against him. And in the
case first cited, DENIo, J., says: "It follows, therefore, from the.
very language of the statutes, that if the Bank of the Commonwealth has invested a part of its capital paid in, in a stock which
is exempt from taxation, such portion is to be excepted from the
assessment."
While, therefore, this decision is to be considered as controlling
upon the question whether in assessing the aggregate value of the
personal estate of an individual or corporation, stock of the United
States should be included, still the question which has now been
submitted to us formed no part of the matters upon which that
Court passed when the subject was before them. A distinction
was then taken between the exemption from taxation of these
stocks under the provisions of the Constitution, which gave Congress power to borrow money on the credit of the United States,
and such exemption if specially enacted by an Act of Congress.
The learned Judge says, "It is the Constitution alone whigh is to
be looked to, for Congress has never passed any law on the subject," and the Court expressed no opinion on the question whether
Congress could enact a law by which the lenders of money to the
government should enjoy the advantages of exemption from State
taxation in respect to such loans; but say, "In the absence of any
such statute, and resting upon the general grant of power contained
iii the Constitution, we are of opinion that the claim to be exempt
from taxation cannot be allowed to prevail."
VOL. XI.--3
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Whatever, therefore, may be the individual opinions of the members of this Court on these questions decided by the Court of
Appeals, we do not feel at liberty to re-examine them in this case,
and the only difference which exists between that case and the
present is as to the effect of the provision of the Act of Congress
of the 25th February, 1862, which says: "All stocks, bonds, and
other securities of the United States, held by individuals, corporations, or associations within the United States, shall be exempt
from taxation by or under State authority."
Two questions arise in regard to this enactmentI. Whether if constitutional such a provision would exempt them
under our laws.
And II. Whether Congress can pass such a law limiting and
restricting the powers of the State in regard to .taxation.
Upon the first point I think there can be little difficulty.
The Act of 1857 expressly' excepts from the personal property
to be valued and assessed all such part of it as shall have been
exempted by law; and DENIG, J., says: "It would be the duty of
the assessors to inquire whether any of this property into which
the capital had been converted was exempted by law from taxation.
The bank is, as a general rule, assessed and taxed for all its property of every kind, but there is an exception as to such part of it
as the Constitution and laws of the Union and of the -State have,
upon special reasons of policy, declared shall be exempted,"
There can be no difficulty under this decision, as well as under
the statute, of coming to the conclusion that such deduction must
be made if the Act of Congress directing the exemption of the
United States stocks and bonds from taxation is valid.
The cases which at various times have been decided in the United
States Court, H. McCullough vs. State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton
316; 'Weston vs. City of Charleston, 2 Peters 449; Osborn vs. The
United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, and others which might be
cited-all hold that special taxation against the stock, bonds, or
incorporations under the United States laws, was forbidden by the
power given to the general government under the constitutional powers conferred upon Congress in connection therewith. To this extent
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I consider the decision of the Court of Appeals, before referred to,
as going. DENio, J., takes the distinction between assessing the
United States stocks and bonds specifically, and including the value
thereof in the valuation of a man's personal estate. He says,
"An unfriendly act of legislation which should exclude the federal government from reverting to the money markets of a particular State for loans, though it might not seriously affect the exercise
of the borrowing power elsewhere, would be so obviously hostile to
the operations of the government that I am confident it could not
be sustained." And again (p. 207), "If the federal stock can be
taxed separately and specifically at any amount which a State Legislature or a municipality to which its power has been delegated
shall see fit, the government, in seeking to obtain money on loan,
may be effectually driven out of the markets of such State."
If it be conceded that the right to borrow money by the Congress
of the United States, granted by the Constitution, prevents the
States from laying a specific tax on such bonds and stocks to an
extent that would interfere with the government in borrowing money in such State, it seems to follow that the government must have
the right to make such loans on such terms and limitations as they
shall deem necessary to make such loans available; and that Congress, in authorizing such loans, is the person that must decide as
to the conditions on which the loans may be taken. If the power
to borrow involves the power to prevent the States from interfering
with such loans by specific taxation, can there be any doubt that
Congress may, for the sake of securing such loans, say to what
extent, if any, the States may tax the same, and add to the terms
on which the stock shall be issued, immunity from taxation throughout the country ? If the States cannot impose a specific tax because it would impair the value, and thereby interfere with the
power of borrowing, may not Congress say, that neither a specific
or general tax shall be imposed by the States, in order to secure
the success of the loan?
The power to borrow money and to issue stock is undoubtedly a
sovereign power, and embraces within it all necessary powers to
carry it effectively into exercise. It cannot be restrained as to

36

THE PEOPLE vs. COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES.

the place throughout the States in which it is to be exercised, nor
the terms on which loans are to be made, nor the mode of transfers it may adopt, or the place where they are to be made, nor the
exemptions which such stocks shall have from public burdens. If
Congress had said no specific tax shall be laid on such stock and
bonds in any of the States, the power to do so would be conceded
under the decisions of the United States Courts, as well as the
Courts of this State. If they can prevent specific taxation, I see
no reason why the same power will not enable them to forbid any
taxation, if in their judgment such restriction is necessary to carry
out the original powers to borrow money. Whether they exercise
that power wisely or not, is not for the Courts to inquire. The
discretion is with them, the power is with them, and when exercised
by them, that exercise of power is within the Constitutional authority " to make all laws which might be necessary or proper to
carry into execution such power."
In The United States vs. Fisher et al., 2 Cranch 258, the right
of Congress to give priority to debts due the United States is
claimed under the general powers to make all necessary laws. In
that case it was said, "Congress must possess the choice of means,
and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution."
The same was said by MARSHALL, C. J., in MeCullough vs. State
of Maryland: "If the end be legitimate and within the scope
of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate, which
are adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect," and "The degree
of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognisance ;" and, in Brown vs. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419, it is said, "Questions of power do not depend upon the degree
to which it may be exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it
must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands it is placed."
It must be apparent, then, if Congress has any power to prohibit taxation of their stocks or bonds specifically, or to give any
privileges to those who buy the same, the extent to which taxation
may be prohibited at all, is an act of discretion, to be exercised by
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Congress, and which cannot be the subject of judicial limitation.
Legislative discretion should not be restrained by judicial decisions.
It is the want of power, and not of discretion in the Legislature,
which can be reviewed by the Courts.
If it were necessary to refer to the condition of public matters,
as rendering it necessary that the general government should possess every power, to enable them advantageously to borrow money,
very urgent reasons could be advanced, to show how necessary is
the right to exercise such powers at the present time, to enable
them to provide the means for the preservation of the government,
but it is not necessary under the views above expressed on these
questions.
It is argued, on behalf of the respondents, that even if the Act
of February, 1862, is valid, it cannot be made applicable to stocks
issued previous to its passage. The ground upon which the exercise of that power by Congress is sustained is, that by such provisions the power of Congress to borrow money is aided, and that
to deprive that body of the power to prescribe the terms on which
the loan could be made, and the privileges be conferred, therefore,
would be to impair the power thus conferred by the Constitution.
I am at a loss to see how that necessity exists as to stocks which
had been issued and paid for long. before its passage. We are
controlled by the decision of the Court of Appeals, that, as to all
stock issued before the passage of that act, it was subject to taxation with the other property of individuals and corporations. It
is, then, presented as a simple statute, in regard to this stock, to
exempt it from taxation by the States, passed long after the government had any interest in its value.
Without such interest, I should doubt the power to exempt such
stocks, any more than any other property, from taxation. As a
declaratory act of the views of Congress, as to their right to 4xempt
stock from taxation, it would, be of value, but it would confer no
power which Congress did not otherwise possess. If the right to
exempt from taxation rests solely on the necessity of the power in
order to enable the United States rightly and advantageously to
carry out the provision of the Constitution as to borrowing money,
such right could not, with propriety, be claimed in regard to stocks
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which had long before been issued, and the consideration for whic
had long before been paid over to the government. Such property
could with no more propriety be exempted from taxation by an Act
of Congress, if such legislation was necessary, than any other property on which taxes might be imposed.
An objection was taken to this proceeding that it was brought
too soon, because no taxes had been imposed. The proceedings
are against the Commissioners as assessors. Their duty is completed
when the assessment is made out. The taxes are imposed by the
Board of Supervisors. The proceedings are to correct the assessment, not the imposition of taxes.
It was said that there was no certainty that any tax would be
imposed.
Independent of the law which requires such taxes to be imposed
equally upon all the property returned as liable to taxation, it can
hardly be supposed even within the bounds of possibility, that an
individual or corporation returned as having large amounts of personal property subject to taxation would not at the present day find
a sufficient amount of taxes imposed thereon.
My conclusions areI. That under the decision of the Court of Appeals in the matter
of The Bank of the Commonwealth (23 N. Y. Rep.), stocks and
bonds of the United States by a resident of the State may be taxed
with other personal estate.
II. That the Act of Congress of February, 1862, exempting
such stocks from taxation is valid, so far as relates to all stocks,
bonds, and other securities issued by the United 'States after the
passage of the act.
III. That such securities are not subject to taxation under the
State laws.
The respondents should be ordered to correct the assessment
rolls by striking from the amount the stock, bonds, and securities
issued by the United States and held by the relator of a date subsequent to the passage of the Act of Congress.
The case decided by the Court of
Appeals, to which reference is made in

the principal case, is reported in 1 Am.
Law Register, N. S. p. 81. The ques.
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tio disLussed in these two cases has
recently assumed such great importance
that a review of them may not be out of
place.
I. It will be admitted by all that the
powers granted to Congress in the United
States Constitution can only be executed
by means, or, as it. is sometimes termed,
by "instruments" or "machinery."
None of the great powers conferred in
that instrument execute themselves. The
power to coin money confers the power
to establish a mint as a proper instrument; the power to regulate commerce,
the right to establish light-houses, the
power to lay taxes, confers the right to
provide custom-houses and- to appoint
collectors and tax gatherers. All these
are the instruments and the machinery
by which the substantial power is vivified; without them the power is inert;
in fact they are a component. part of the
power granted. For greater caution a
clause was inserted in the Constitution
that Congress shall have power to make
all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the
powers previously granted; but the
better opinion is that no new authority
was conferred by this provision. The
power to borrow money is no exception
to this principle. This can only b exercised by instruments-such as government bonds or treasury notes. The
government could no more borrow money
without them than commerce could be
carried on without bills of lading. Such
bonds and notes are just as truly the
instruments of borrowing or of finance as
a mint is the instrument by which the
power to coin money is exercised, or
custom-houses are the means by which
the power to collect taxes is carried into
effect. It is a mistake then to regard
government securities merely as evidences of debt. They are also the means
by which the indebtedness is contracted.

Ir. It is a well settled rule that no
instrument or machinery of the general
government can be interfered with by
the States. No one has been hardy
enough to claim that the mint or customhouses could be taxed by State authorities, or that munitions of war could be
taxed even though within the territorial
jurisdiction of the State. The early
lawyers seem to have been of the same
opinion as to evidences of debt issued
by the general government. Thus Mr.
Hammond of Ohio, in Osburn vs. United
States Bank, 9 Wheaton 738, arguing
against the claims of the general government, and insisting that the State authorities could tax the bank, pitched upon
this as the best illustration of the class
of cases where the States could not interfere. He says: "If the nation borrow
money, it is competent for the nation to
decide upon the evidence to be given of
the debt. It would be absurd to subject
this national measure to the municipal
regulations of one of its parts, and thus
permit a part to assess a tax upon the
whole." P. 777.
This concession, after the case of
McCullough vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
116, is remarkable as showing that at
that time any assertion on the part of
the States of the power to tax United
States securities was deemed to be uAtenable. It is believed that a critical
examination of the three great cases
upon this subject will lead to the same
-conclusion. They are McCullough vs.
Maryland, auyra, Osburn vs. United
States Bank, and Weston vs. City of
Charleston, 2 Peters 449. In the first
case the facts were. that the Legislature
of Maryland enacted that no bank established in that State by any authority
other than the State Legislature, should
issue any notes except upon stamped
paper, to be furnished by the executive
of the State at certain specified rates.
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A commutation might be made on the
part of the bank by paying to the State
treasurer a sum mentioned in the act.
This law, which embraced the Branch
of the United States Bank, situated in
Maryland, was alleged by that institution to be unconstitutional. It will be
noticed that the tax was laid upon the
notes of the bank, which were the means
by which the bank exercised its powers
in behalf of the United States government. It is true that the tax was a
special one-that these notes were
singled out from other subjects of taxation-but the reasoning of the counsel
and of the Court did not proceed upon
that ground. It is not easy to perceive
why, if the power to tax resides in a
State government, it may not select the
special objects for taxation at its own
discretion, unless hampered by some
provision in the State Constitution.
The power to tax involves the power to
discriminate between subjects of taxation. The principles of political economy teach that absolute equality of taxation is often the greatest injustice, and
rules are laid down by means of which
a proper discrimination may be made.
If a discretion exists, the Courts cannot
determine whether it is wisely or unwisely exercised. If the Legislature
have the power to deliberate and to
decide, the conclusion which it reaches
is wholly beyond the scope of judicial
action. The question, therefore, was
discussed upon the broad principle that
a State cannot tax the property of the
United States, or the instruments employed
in executing itspowers. Thus Mr. Webster
cites the clause in the Articles of Confederation which provided "that no-impositions, duties, or restrictions should
be laid by any State on the property of
the United States." He adds: "Is it
Qupposed that property of the United
States is now subject to the power of
the State governments in a greater

degree than under the Confederation?'
4 Wheaton 328. Mr. Hopkinson, one of
the counsel for the State, asserted the
question before the Court to be whether
the bank and its branches could claim
to be exempt from the ordinary and equaltaxation of property as assessed in the
States in which they are placed. P. 337.
Mr. Pinkney remarked that there must
be in this case an implied exception to
the general taxing power of the States,
because it is a tax upon the legislative
faculty of Congress, upon the national
property, upon the national institutions.
P. 394. And again: "the Bank of the
United States is as much an instrument of
the government for fiscal purposes as the
Courts are its.instruments for judicial
purposes. Though every State may impose a stamp tax, yet no State can lay
a stamp tax upon the judicial proceedings or custom-house papers of the
United States. But there is no such
express exception to the general taxing
power of the States contained in the
Constitution. It arises from the general
nature of the government, and from the
principle of the supremacy of the
national powers and the laws made to
execute them over the State authorities
and State laws." p. 396. MARSHALL,
C. T., in delivering the opinion of the
Court, lays no stress upon the point
that this tax was special in its nature,
but his opinion proceeds upon the theory
that the bank was an instrument by which
the general government exercised its
functions. He stated that the sovereignty of the State in the article of
taxtation may be controlled by the Constitution of the United States, and that
the question became purely one of construction as to the meaning of the Constitution. He added that the means
employed by the United States government were given by the people of all the
States, and that therefore the people of
a single State could not confer a sove-
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reignty which will extend over them.
As the right never existed, the question
whether it has been surrendered cannot
arise. He then says: "If the States may
tax one instrument employed by the
government in the execution of its
powers, they may tax any and every
other instrument. They may tax the
mail; they may tax the mint; they may
tax patent rights; they may tax the
papers of the custom-house; they may
tax judicial process," &c., p. 432. After
explaining some passages in the Federalist, which some had supposed conflicted with these views, and showing
that they had been misapprehended, he
closed by distinctly holding that the
United States Bank was an instrument
of the government, and the tax was unconstitutional.
It is impossible to read this case with
attention without being convinced that
the Court intended to place this decision
upon the broad ground that the notes
of the United States Bank could not be
taxed by a State. The fact that the tax
was a special one, was subordinate and
incidental, and in nowise affected the
principle. It is not even alluded to in
the opinion. The case also decided that
a note of the United States Bank was an
instrument of the United States government.
A dictum occurring at the close of the
opinion, has caused some confusion
upon this subject. It is remarked by
the Court that the opinion does not extend to a tax imposed on the interest:
-which citizens of Maryland may hold in
this institution in common with other
property of the same description throughout the State. This point was wholly
foreign to the case before the Court.
If it be good law, the purchase of stock
in such a corporation by private persons
for private purposes bears no analogy to
the issue of notes by the bank, or of
bonds and notes by the United States

government.. The bank stock is issued
purely and simply as evidence of property; the notes and bonds are evidences of contracts with third parties.
and are the instruments by means of
which such contracts are made. For a
like reason no tax could be laid upon
the bank as such, because its efficiency
as an instrument of the government
might be impaired.
In Osburn vs. United States Bank, 9
Wheaton 738, the Court were asked to
review their decision previously made
in McCullough vs. Maryland. No attempt is made by counsel to impugn the
argument of the Court in that case.
They expressly admit it in all its bearings. They only assail the premises.
They urge that the bank is a private
corporation, not the instrument of government. If it were, it could not be
taxed at all. Mr. Hammond, in this
connection, makes the statement in re
gard to government securities already
noticed. The Court affirms the previ
ous decision upon the same principles
It however discusses, somewhat more
fully, the doctrine of implied exemption
from State authority. It says, "If the
sound construction of the Act be that it
exempts the trade of the bank as being
essential to the character of a machine,
necessary to the fiscal operations of the
government from the control of the
States, Courts are as much bound to
give it that construction as if the exemption had been established in express terms." P. 366.
The only question which remains after
these decisions, is, to inquire whether
the securities of the United States are
embraced within the same principle as
notes of the United States Bank. If
not, we arrive at the conclusion that
"notes" of the bank-an instrument
of government-cannot be taxed, while
"notes" of the government which em-
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ploys that instrument may be. But if
notes of the bank-the instrument of
an instrument-were part of the financial machinery of the general government, and thus not taxable, a fortiori
the notes and bonds of the general government itself are a part of its mathinery as being the direct instruments
of finance. (We purposely abstain from
calling government securities "stock."
They are contracts, and nothing more.)
It may, however, be said, that the tax
in McCullough vs. Maryland was levied
at the time when the notes were issued
by the bank, and that there would be
no objection to a tax after the note had
come into the hands of a-private holder.
For a like reason a tax might be laid
upon government notes and bonds. It
would then be simply a tax upon the
property of the owner in the note or
bond, and not a tax upon the security
itself. The "instrument" of government (the note or bond) would then
have spent its force, as such, and it
would simply be an evidence of property. This question came up before
the Court in -Weston vs. City of Charleston, 2 Peters 449. The City of Charleston, by a local ordinance, had laid a tax
of one quarter of one per cent. upon
the following species of property: All
personal estate, consisting of bonds,
notes, insurance stock, six and seven
per cent. stock of the United States, or
other obligations, upon which interest
has been or will be received during the
year, over and above the interest which
has been paid (funded stock of this
State, and stock of the incorporated
banks of this State, and the United
States Bank excepted.)
It appears, from Mr. Justice THomPsoN's dissenting opinion, that the ordi-

nance in question was not in full before
the Court, but only one clause in it.
The fair inference from his statement

is, that there were many other articles

specified in the ordinance. He objects
to the assertion made by a dissenting
Judge in the State Court, to which the
writ of error was issued, that the tax
was upon the United States stock eo
vomine. This could only mean, he says,
that it was enumerated as one description in a long list of specified property
subject to taxation. The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, paid no
attention to this incidental point, any
more than it did in McCullough vs. Maryland, but grappled with the main
question, Can the United States securities be taxed by the States at all? The
line of argument is, that the right to
tax the securities of the United States
is the right to tax an instrument used
by the government in carrying into
effect its acknowledged power to borrow money. Say the Court, "We retain the opinions expressed in McCullough vs. Maryland. A contract made
by the government, in the exercise of
its power to borrow money, &c., is undoubtedly independent of the will of
any State in which the individual who
lends it may reside, and is undoubtedly
an operation essential to the important

objects for which the government was
created." Nor did it make any difference that the stock had been issued before the tax was laid. Mr. Legarh had
urged upon the Court, in his argument,
that the case came within 'the exception
assumed in McCullough vs. Maryland,
and that the government securities
might be taxed in common with all
other private property in the State. P.

462. The Court expressly denied this
proposition, and held that the tax on
government securities was a tax on the
contract--A TAx ON THE POWER TO BORROW

MONEY

ON

THE

CREDIT OF

THE

UNITED STATES. P. 469.
These three cases appear to be in
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complete harmony, and are to beLregarded as instances of the application
of a single principle, which is, that the
instruments-by which the general government exercises its powers are not
subject to State taxation.
The result may be stated in the following propositions:1. It must be regarded as well settled
upon principle, that the instruments, or
machinery by which the United States
government exercises its acknowledged
powers, are not subject, in any form, to
be taxed by the State authorities. They
cannot be included in the mass of property which may be taxed, but are altogether exempt, for the reason that that
which is created by all the States for
the benefit of all, is not subject to the
control of any one of them. The right to
tax these instruments was never surrendered by the States, for it nmver existed
in their favor.
2. The bonds and notes issued by the
United States are the instruments or
machinery by which the power to borrow is exercised. A tax upon them is
"a tax upon the power to borrow money
on the credit of the United States."
3. These principles are sustained by
the authorities. The first case presented itself simply as a power to tax the
note3 of the United States Bank, and it
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was heldthat these were the machinery
or instruments by -which the'general
government e~ercised its financial functions through the medium of a bank,
and- that they could not be taxed any
more than the bank itself. At another
time, the question of the right to tax
United States bonds or securities, after
they were issued, came before the Court,
and they were also held to be the machinery by which the general government exercised its financial powers. It
was not necessary for Congress to exempt them from taxation, for the exemption is implied. They can no more be
taxed in the hand of the holder than at
the time they are issued. Tbey are
issued by the general government for
the benefit of all, and cannot be subject to the control of any particular
State.
In reaching these conclusions, we regret that they come in conflict with the
judgment of the able and enlightened
Court which pronounced the opinion in
The People vs. Commissioners of Taxes,
23 N. Y. 192: S. C. 1 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 81. This case might have caused
us to distrust our own reasoning, had it
not appeared to us to have the support
of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the ultimate arbiter of the question."
T. W. D.

In the Supreme Oourt of the State of ew York, February General
Term, 1862.
1AMES S.

KUCHLER VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

1. A statute of the State of New York of 1860, entitled "An act in relation to
capital punishment, and to provide for -the more certain punishment of the
crime of murder," was held by the Court of Appeals, on the one hand, to have
repealed absolutely all previous statutes providing for the punishment of murder,
and on the other, to be itself unconstitutional in establishing a new mode of
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punishment, so far as it applied to crimes committed before its passage. A
judgment on a conviction in the Oyer and Terminer, under an indictment found
after the passage of the act, for a murder committed before, was for this reason
reversed in the Supreme Court, but there was no error in the trial or conviction
itself. Held, that the Court was bound thereupon to discharge the prisoner, and
could not direct. a new trial.
2 The statute in regard to writs of error in criminal cases, only authorizes a new
trial on reversal of the judgment, where the error is of a character which renders the trial and conviction illegal, so that the prisoner cannot legally be said to
have been in jeopardy.
8 Hartung's Case, 22 New York 95, observed upon.

Error to the Erie Oyer and Terminer.
Present-DAVIS, P. J.,

GROVER AND HOYT, JS.

B. Cooke, for plaintiff in error.
_F. J. ithian, District Attorney, for defendants.
DAVIS, J.-Before the passage of the Act of April 14, 1860,
entitled "An act in relation to capital punishment, and to provide
for the more certain punishment of the crime of murder," James
S. Kuchler, the plaintiff in error, committed murder by poisoning
his wife. He was indicted, and after that act went into effect, was
tried and convicted, and sentenced to be imprisoned and executed,
pursuant to its provisions. It is now established by the Court of
Appeals, in Hfartung vs. The People, 22 N. Y. R. 95, that the
provisions of the act, under which judgment was pronounced on
the plaintiff in error, in so far as they apply to offences committed
before that law became operative, are ex post fact.o, and therefore
unconstitutional and void. This determines, without further discussion, that the judgment in this case is erroneous, and must be
reversed.
The important question then arises, what disposition should be
made of the case, upon the reversal of the judgment ?
The trial of the prisoner and his conviction were, in all respects.
regular and legal, and no exceptions to them are brought before
us. The writ of error has brought up the record alone, and no
qluestion is made except upon the illegality of the judgment, pro-
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nounced upon a proper conviction. Untrammelled by statutes or
decisions, there would seem to be no difficulty in holding, that the
true course in such a case would be, on reversing the erroneous
judgment, to direct the Court below to pronounce the proper judgment on conviction. So far as we have decisions on this question,
they are based on the English cases, without pausing to inquiro
whether those cases are applicable to our system or not. In
Quimbo Appo's Case, 19 N. Y. 581, it is settled that the Oyer
and Terminer of the several counties of this State "is a permanent
and continuous court, and its successive sessions are terms of the
same, and not of distinct tribunals ;" and the difference between
it and the English courts of Oyer and Terminer, which are held by
virtue of special commission from the Crown, which expire with
each session, is vefy clearly shown. When, under the English
system, a judgment was reversed on writ of error, because the
Oyer and Terminer had given an illegal judgment upon a regular
conviction, there remained no court below who could be directed
to pronounce the proper judgment. It is not so with us, and
therefore the reason for the rule failing, the rule itself is not
applicable to, and never ought to have been brought into our
practice.
But while the decisions would not have restrained us from directing the Oyer and Terminer to proceed to give the proper judgment
in this case, the provisions of the statute regulating the practice
on writs of error in such case must be respected. The statute
provides (2 R. S. 741, § 24) that "if the Supreme Court shall
reverse the judgment rendered, it shall eitler direct a new trial, or
that the defendant be absolutely discharged, according to the circumstances of the case."
One of the alternatives of this statute, either to direct a new
trial, or to discharge the defendant absolutely, must be pursued;
and this necessarily precludes us from directing the Court below to
proceed to the proper sentence, and relieves us from inquiring
whether there was any sentence that could have been lawfully pronounced, left by the blind and sweeping changes of the act of
1860.
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The question for our examination is, therefore, narrowed down
to this: Can we direct a new trial, or must the prisoner be absolutely discharged ? It is insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff
in error, that it is authoritatively settled in this State, that where
the writ of error brings up the record alone, without a bill of
exceptions, and the judgment is reversed for error manifest in the
record, this Court cannot order a new trial, but must discharge the
prisoner absolutely. Before bills of exceptions were extended by
statute to criminal cases, the Court had no power to grant new
trials in cases of felony and treason, where the proceedings
appeared by the record to have been regular. Neither the merits
nor the proceedings in the progress of the trial were reviewable on
writ of error: People vs. Comstock, 8 Wend. 549; 8 B1. Com.
388; 13 East 416; Chit. Cr. Law 532. Thii-rule of the common
law has been followed since our statute, and it has been said that
new trials can be granted now only where the judgment is reversed
upon bill of exceptions: The People vs. Taylor, 3 Denio 91;
O'Leary vs. The People, 4 Parker 193.
In The People vs. Taylor, the point was not at all involved, and
the very eminent judge who pronounced the opinion was evidently
only stating the common law rule, without respect to any statute.
He neither referred to the statute nor in anywise considered its
effect upon the former rule, and ought not to be regarded as holding
in his merely incidental dictum, that the statute had not changed
the common law. In O'Leary vs. The People, the Court, so far
as the point was considered, fdllowed The People vs. Taylor, without considering the question in the light of the atatute. In the
Hartung case the Court of Appeals (as the reporter informs us in
his notes), on reversing the judgment ordered a new trial, "not
being able judicially to see, that upon a new trial the prisoner
might not be convicted of manslaughter in some inferior degree."
A bill of exceptions was in that case annexed to the record, but no
error was found in the bill, and the judgment was reversed solely
because of the effect of the law of 1860 on the case. It would be
impeaching the good sense of that Court to say that in a case
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where no error appeared in the bill of exceptions, it held it to be
proper to grant a new trial for error found only in the record,
simply because a bill was attached to the record. It must have
been considered that the statute had given the Court power to
order a new trial "according to the circumstances of the case,"
and in that respect had changed the common law rule, or, which is
possible, the order was entered without considering the point at
all. In either view, the case is perhaps not to be considered as an
authority on the question. The statute, in plain terms, embraces
all criminal cases brought before the Court by writ of error,
whether the alleged error is in the judgment record, or in a bill of
exceptions annexed toit, and in my opinion the true test to determine what order shall be made on a reversal is, whether a new trial
can be legally effective or not. It is sometimes apparent on the
record, that no conviction can lawfully be obtained, as where the
indictment is fatally defective, or where the circumstances are such
that the prisoner cannot be re-tried, without a violation of his
constitutional or legal rights ; and in all such cases it is the duty
of the Court to discharge the prisoner absolutely; but where the
,error, though apparent in the record only, is of a character that
renders the trial and conviction illegal, so that the prisoner cannot
legally be said to have been in jeopardy, the statute, in my judgment, authorizes this Court to order a new trial.
But, in the case at bar, the conclusion is forced upon my mind
that there can be no new trial. The trial and conviction that have
taken place were, in all respects, regular and legal. When the
verdict was rendered the prisoner stood lawfully convicted of
murder: 4 Bl. Com. 362. The legislature (to that purpose
omnipotent both in wisdom and folly) had repealed all statutes
prescribing his sentence and punishment, under circumstances
where the common law was not revived: Hartung vs. The -People,
22 N. Y. 95. The sentence, attempted to be substituted, was
unconstitutional; and we are bompelled, by reverence for the Constitution as well as for the adjudication of the Court of Appeals,
to reverse it. But the legal conviction, upon a regular trial,
remains a fact, of which the prisoner is entitled to avail himself.
His plea of autrefois convict would be a bar to a new trial, and
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would, as it seems to me, be established by producing the record
now brought before us.. "The plea of autrefois convict, or a former

conviction for the same identical crime, though no judgment was
ever given, or perhaps will be (being suspended by the benefit of
clergy or other cause), is a good plea in bar to an indictment :" 4
Bl. Com. 336. In The State vs. Benham, 7 Conn. 414, it was
held that the verdict itself constitutes the bar, and in The State
vs. Morrell, 2 Yerg. 24, that this is so, even when the judgment is
improperly arrested upon a good indictment: 2 Cow. and H.
Notes 955.
The prisoner could not be deprived of the benefit of that plea by
the answer that the judgment pronounced on the conviction was
illegal. It was no fault of his that the legislature had deprived
him of his well-earned deserts to be hanged; -nor that the Court,
obedient to the letter of the act, pronounced the sentence it prescribed. It is a familiar maxim of the common law, "Nemo debet
bis vexari pro eadem causa." This maxim is embodied in the
Constitution of this State, and of the United States. The former
declares that "no person ,shall be subject twice to be put in
jeopardy for the same offence:" Sec. 6, Art. 1, Const. of N. Y.
The latter, "nor shall any person be subject, for the same offence,
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb :" Art. 5, Amend.
Const. U. S.
It needs neither argument nor authority to show that these provisions are applicable to a case where, upon a regular trial, there
has been a lawful conviction of a felony. They protect the
prisoner from another trial, and the result under the statute is his
absolute discharge.
To discharge the prisoner, so justly convicted of his appalling
crime, is a most painful duty; but in our view the law leaves us no
alternative. If the result in his care, and in the parallel one of
Mrs. Hartung (in one of which a faithful wife, in the other a confiding husband were deliberately poisoned to death to give scope
to the embraces of a paramour and prostitute), shall form beacons
to warn against future imitation of the folly and stupidity of the
act of 1860, they will not be wholly without benefit to the commu.
nity.
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Supreme court of Pennsylvania, 1862.
ECKERT VS.

CAMERON ET AL.

I. A letter written by the maker of a note to the holder, before the discount of it
by him, is not admissible in an action by the latter against an indorser, to show
tbat the indorsement was an accommodation one. "
2. Where an indorsed note comes into the possession of the maker before it is due,
there is no presumption of payment or extinguishment; and, therefore, one who
discounts the note under such circumstances for the maker is an innocent holder
for value, and is entitled to recover from any of the parties to it.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon county.
The opinion of the .Court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-It

Would be difficult to vindicate the admission of

the contents of a letter to the plaintiffs below, written by Shaner
in the absence of Eckert, and before the notes were made which the
plaintiff discounted. It is not easy to see how one who has indorsed
a promissory note, can be affected by the declarations of the maker,
of which he had no knowledge, and which were made before the
note had any existence. Shaner the maker, the letter or its contents (for its loss was sufficiently proved) would have been legitimate
evidence to show that the indorsements were made for their accommodation, that is, were such proof necessary. But how could the
letter be evidence against Eckert ? The Court received it not as
proof of Shaner's declaration, but, to use the language of the Judge,
"as evidence of the contract." What contract? If between
Myers and Shaner, or Shaner and the plaintiffs, it was evident to
the case, res inter alios partes. If between the plaintiffs 4nd the
defendant, how could the ex parte declarations of Shaner tend to
prove it? In admitting this we think the Court inadvertently fell
into an error, for which we should be constrained to direct a venire
de novo were it not that the mistake could have done the defendant
no harm, and a reversal of the judgment would not prove of ultimate service to him. There was, it is true, other evidence from
which the jury might well have found that he had indorsed the note
for the accommodation of Myers and Shaner. That other evidence
VoL. XI.-4
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is to be found in the recitals made in the assignments of the
accounts and stock, and in the testimony of George Hoffman and
Jacob Dehuff. Yet it would be impossible for us to know whether
the jury did not rest their verdict in whole or in part upon Shaner's
letter.
But, was it necessary for the plaintiffs to prove by affirmative
evidence, that the defendant was an accommodation indorser ?. They
had discounted the notes for the makers, on the day of their date,
before their maturity, and with the defendant's indorsement upon
them. Under such circumstances were the indorsements not binding, unless it was proved that the notes had never before been negotiated, but were indorsed for the convenience of the drawers ?
A bill or note which has been once in circulation, overdue, and
coming from the hands of the acceptor or maker; is presumed to be
extinguished: Byles on Bills 180; McGee vs. Prouty, 9 Ietcalf 546.
This is because it was the duty of the maker or acceptor to take it
up when it fell due, and therefore it is fairly inferable from his
possession of it, after that time, that it has fulfilled its office. But
before it has fallen due, the maker of a promissory note is under
no obligation to take it up, and the reason fails for presuming its
extinguishment from his then having it in his possession. And with
the failure of the reason, it is fair to conclude that the rule also
ceases. When, as in this case, the maker offers to discount an
indorsed note, on the day of its date, and before its maturity, the
law does not infer from the indorsement and from the possession
of the maker, that the note has been either paid or extinguished.
It may be doubted'whether the condition of such a note proves
that it has been in circulation; whether indeed it is not rather a
just inference that the indorsement was made for the accommodation of the maker, and the whole left him to raise money upon, it.
In Burbridge vs. Manners, 3 Camp. 193, Lord EnLLENnOROUGH
said, "payment means payment in due course, and not by anticipation." "I agree," said he, "that a bill paid at maturity cannot
be reissued, and that no action can afterwards be maintained upon
it by a subsequent indorsee. A payment before it comes due, however, I think, does not extinguish it, any more than if it were
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merely discounted." Now, possession by a maker, after an indorsement, certainly cannot amount to more than proof of payment.
Burbridge vs. Manners was a suit against the indorsee of a promisspry note which had been paid a few days before it came due, but
not cancelled, and which afterwards came into the hands of the
plaintiff before its maturity. The plaintiff was permitted to recover.
And in Morley vs. Culverwell, 7 Meeson & Welsby 174, it appeared
that a bill of exchange which had been accepted was satisfied four
days before it fell due by the acceptor, and delivered up to him by
the drawer, uncancelled. It was held, notwithstanding this, that
the drawer was liable on it to a party to whom the acceptor afterwards indorsed it for value, before it became due. This was the
unanimous opinion of the Court of Exchequer, and the language
of the barons completely vindicate their judgment. Lord ABINGER,
Chief Baron, said, "the contract of the drawer and of each
indorser is that the bill shall be paid by the acceptor at its
maturity, not before it is due, that it shall be paid according
to its tenor and effect, that is, when it becomes due. If upon
its being discharged before it becomes due, the drawer inadvertently leaves his name upon the bill, he is but in the ordinary
case of a party who has a bill in negotiation, vith his name
upon it against his intention. It is in the hands of an innocent
holder who has no notice that it has been discharged. Suppose
mutual accommodation acceptances to be given, and to be exchanged
before they have been negotiated, the names remaining on them,
the parties may circulate them so as to give a title to a bond fide
holder before they become due, and wherein does this case differ
from that? Therefore a bill is not properly paid and stisfied
according to its tenor unless it be paid when due; and consequently, if it be satisfied before it is due, by an arrangement
between the drawer and acceptor, that does not prevent the acceptor
from negotiating it, or an innocent holder for value from recovering
upon it." In the same case Baron Parke said, "Nothing will discharge the acceptor or the drawer except payment according to
the law merchant, that is payment of the bill at maturity. If a
party pays it before he purchases it, he is in the same situation as

